The order of buying and selling: Multiple equilibria in the housing market by Sniekers, F.J.T.
The order of buying and selling:
Multiple equilibria in the housing market
Florian Sniekers∗
May 7, 2014
Abstract
Moving between owner-occupied houses requires both buying and selling. During the Great
Recession, the majority of movers sold their old houses before buying new ones, while in the
preceding years the majority first bought new houses. In an equilibrium search model, by
choosing the order of buying and selling, households affect the composition of buyer and seller
types in the market. Because of their different outside options, different types bargain for
different prices. Since prices have an impact on the incentives to enter the market as buyer
or seller, a complementarity in the order of buying and selling exists. The resulting multiple
equilibria can explain observed differences in trading volumes. Moreover, when all movers
first buy and therefore own two houses for some time, the fraction of people paying double
housing expenses is lower than when households enter as buyers and sellers simultaneously,
due to a smaller time to sale.
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1 Introduction
Houses are illiquid assets. Due to search frictions, buying and selling takes time. Moreover,
moving between owner-occupied houses requires both buying and selling. The fact that
moving requires two transactions results in two potential problems for a household. On
the one hand, households that buy a new house but have problems selling their old house,
suffer from double housing expenses. Households that sell their old house before finding a
new one, on the other hand, are stuck in temporary housing in between. It depends on the
tightness of the market to what extent being in either of these states is likely to last long.
Households realize these potential problems, and try to deal with them. One of the few
options that is available to an individual household with a desire to move, is to choose the
order of buying and selling. Households can first search to buy a new house, first search
to sell their old house, or do both at the same time. However, if households collectively
choose one of these search strategies, they affect the composition of buyer and seller types
in the market. Different types of buyers and sellers have different outside options, and
therefore bargain for different prices. This paper shows that first buying and then selling can
generate the composition of buyers and sellers that makes this order of buying and selling
individually rational to households. If, however, households would simultaneously enter the
market as sellers and buyers, they would create the market conditions that would make this
alternative search strategy rational. The same mechanisms apply in an equilibrium in which
households first sell and then buy. The resulting multiple equilibria can explain empirically
observed phases of high and low trading volumes in the housing market. In general, the
equilibria can be ranked in terms of welfare, as different equilibria are characterized by
different probabilities of moving out of inferior situations.
The data in table 1 can be interpreted as evidence for different search strategies before
and during the Great Recession. The first column of the table provides the fractions
of buyers in the Netherlands who, before buying a new house, lived in owner-occupied
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housing. The second column presents the fraction that lived in rental housing.1 Data
are only available for five years, but interestingly, for periods before and during the Great
Recession. The third column shows the total number of transactions in the Netherlands.
The data show that the number of transactions before the Great Recession - in 1998, 1999,
and 2000 - is significantly larger than the number of transactions during the Great Recession
- in 2010 and 2011. Interestingly, these periods are associated with quite different fractions
of buyers from owner-occupied and rental housing. In the period before the Great Recession,
the majority of buyers previously lived in owner-occupied housing, whereas after the Great
Recession, the majority of buyers lived in rental housing. These data can be interpreted
in multiple ways.2 The interpretation of this paper is that buyers choose different search
strategies in periods of high and periods of low liquidity.
Year Fraction of owners Fraction of renters Number of transactions
1998 0.53 0.47 192622
1999 0.58 0.42 204538
2000 0.61 0.39 189358
2010 0.47 0.53 126127
2011 0.47 0.53 120739
Table 1: Fractions of buyers previously owning and renting a house, and the total number of
transactions in the Netherlands. Data from Statistics Netherlands, only available for five years.
Three other papers explicitly recognize that it matters whether a household first buys
or first sells a house. The first paper, Anglin (2004), focuses on the implications of this
issue for the length of time required by a household to move, and its empirical estimation
(by the proportional hazard model). Although he presents some extensions that can make
1These fractions only refer to the total of buyers that already participated on the housing market
(existed as households) and of which their previous housing is known, so that the fractions sum up to one.
These buyers constitute the majority of buyers, and are the population that actually have different search
options.
2Unfortunately, the data (on fractions, not on transactions) on 1998, 1999, and 2000 are from a different
data set than those on 2010 and 2011. The first data set considers households searching to buy a house,
whereas the second set covers households that actually bought a house. Consequently, a simple difference
in search effort between renters and owners can explain the different fractions. On the other hand, the
correlation between the total number of searchers and the actual number of transactions, within those
three years, is 0.96. Secondly, the different fractions could also result from a changing housing supply,
either in composition or relative to the population. However, the housing supply relative to the number of
households remained constant over these years, and the relative supply of rental housing did not increase.
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an individual household move sooner, Anglin doesn’t discuss the equilibrium aspects of the
decision to first sell or to first buy a house. The second paper, by Maury and Tripier (2010),
fills this gap to a large extent by showing that price dispersion is likely in equilibrium. It has
a very similar setup as my paper, but they do not allow search strategies to affect market
tightness. By fixing the probability to buy and to sell at an equal rate, they exclude the
important feedback mechanism of the order of buying and selling. In general, in- and
outflow rates will differ across equilibria. As a result, welfare can no longer be determined
only by the value of a household satisfied with her house, and equilibrium rankings can be
overturned. Moreover, fixing the same in- and outflow rates across equilibria boils down to
assuming a different housing supply for each. From this perspective, Maury and Tripier’s
‘multiple equilibria’ differ in fundamentals. Finally, Anenberg and Bayer (2013) show that
the ’joint buyer-seller problem’ amplifies booms and busts that result from shocks to the
flow of new buyers. This ’joint buyer-seller problem’ is modeled by sellers in one segment of
the housing market that constitute the potential buyers in a second segment of the market.
While very similar in motivation to my paper, Anenberg and Bayer limit complementarities
by ruling out moving from the second to the first segment. Consequently, they do not study
the existence of multiple equilibria, but provide a model rich enough to be estimated on
empirical data. Only my paper explains phases of high and low liquidity in the housing
market with a purely endogenous mechanism.
The seminal Wheaton (1990) and the more recent Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) also
consider a housing market with random search, but do not allow households to have a choice
about how and when to move. This paper extends their contributions to an equilibrium
search model in which households can choose to first look for a new house, or simultaneously
to search for a buyer for their old house. In contrast, in Wheaton (1990), households have
to buy a new house before they can sell their old house, whereas in Piazzesi and Schneider
(2009), households have to sell their old house before they can buy a new one.
In Krainer (2001), households can accumulate an infinite number of houses, essentially
making the choice to search to sell and to search to buy independent decisions. As a
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result, in an equilibrium with trade households always do both at the same time. In my
model, households cannot own more than two houses. On top of that, households that
own two houses pay an additional fee, capturing double housing expenses. While a first
house can be financed by a mortgage without financial frictions, such frictions kick in when
a household buys a second house. Indeed assuming that moral hazard problems increase
with the amount borrowed, a first house can be financed at the common discount rate
(or paid out of pocket, with opportunity costs discounted at the same rate), whereas a
second house can only be financed at an additional flow cost. Moral hazard problems are
prohibitively large for buying a third house. In this way I rule out pure down-payment
effects, at the core of the argument in for instance Stein (1995), but still capture financial
constraints in a parsimonious manner.
By focusing on the impact of different search strategies, I provide a mechanism that can
endogenously create more or less desperate households in the housing market. For that
reason, equilibrium price dispersion is a common phenomenon in this model, even though
households are ex ante homogeneous. In this way, I endogenize the motivational shocks
in Albrecht, Anderson, Smith, and Vroman (2007), which exogenously turn relaxed buyers
and sellers into desperate ones. As a result, also in my model expected prices conditional
on time to sale fall with time spent on the market. Moreover, my endogenous mechanism
allows for a richer variety in the composition of buyer and seller types, which gives rise to
a new source of equilibrium multiplicity. Besides, I keep track of the equilibrium stocks
and flows of buyer and seller types, instead of introducing them exogenously at a constant
and equal rate, to explain the observed differences in trading volume between the Great
Recession and the years preceding it.
2 Setup of the housing market
In this section I present the setup of an equilibrium search model of the owner-occupied
housing market. I follow Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) in assuming a competitive rental
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market next to the owner-occupied housing market, while the latter is characterized by
search frictions. The model describes short-run equilibria in the sense that the supply of
housing is constant, and I only analyze steady states. Besides, I only consider symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria.
2.1 Equilibrium overview
Time is continuous, the population consists of a unit mass of households, and h ∈ (0, 2)
stands for the measure of houses available for owner-occupied housing. I abstract from
heterogeneity in houses, apart from idiosyncratic characteristics that give rise to search
frictions. The unit mass of households consists of four types: households satisfied with
the characteristics of the house they own (high valuation owners), households unsatisfied
with the characteristics of the house they own (low valuation owners), households that
own two houses (double owners), and households that own no house, but rent temporary
housing (renters). Define the measure of renters in the population as µR, the measure of low
valuation owners as µL, the measure of high valuation owners as µH , and the measure of
double owners as µD. Houses are owned by high valuation, low valuation or double owners,
where the latter own two houses, so that h = µH + µL + 2µD. Renters live in apartments
outside housing supply h, not in the µD unoccupied houses.
3 Finally, define the measure
of buyers as µB and the measure of sellers as µS.
Individual households make transitions between the types, as shown in figure 1. At some
positive exogenous Poisson rate η > 0 a high valuation owner receives a preference shock,
turning her into a low valuation owner. The preference shock captures exogenous reasons
for a desire to move, such as finding a new job elsewhere. A low valuation owner is no
longer satisfied with her house, but still owns it. She would like to move to a new house
that she is satisfied with, but moving requires finding a new house, and finding a buyer for
her old house. The figure shows that there are two ways out of the low valuation state,
3Often mortgage contracts do not allow owners to rent out their houses. Double owners may also not
want to rent out their old houses, as this would hinder selling them.
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via double ownership or via renting. The low valuation owner becomes a double owner if
she first buys a new house, whereas she becomes a renter if she first sells her old house.
All sellers find interested buyers at the same (endogenous) Poisson rate p, and all buyers
find houses to their liking at the same (endogenous) Poisson rate q. As discussed, due to
financial limitations, a double owner cannot buy more than two houses. For simplicity, I
assume that a double owner is no longer subject to preference shocks, so that she has a high
valuation of exactly one of her houses.4 Her only option is thus to sell the house she doesn’t
like anymore, and to become a high valuation owner. Similarly, the only option available
to a renter is to buy a new house. This route also results in high valuation ownership, and
thus makes the household subject to preference shocks again.
High valuation owner 
Low valuation owner 
Double owner Renter 
High valuation owner 
η 
q 
p q 
p 
Figure 1: Transitions and their respective Poisson rates of the simultaneous equilibrium
Because I only consider symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, if one household of any type
searches, then all households of that type search. If low valuation owners enter the market
both as sellers and as buyers, and if double owners and renters search as well, then we
have an equilibrium with two types of buyers and two types of sellers. Both renters and
low valuation owners search for a new house, so that the total measure of buyers in this
equilibrium is µB = µR + µL. Both double owners and low valuation owners search to
4As a rationale for this assumption, assume there are two categories of houses - e.g. houses in the city
and houses in the countryside - and that shocks make households’ preferences only switch between these
two categories. Houses within each category still differ in their idiosyncratic characteristics, so that not
all houses of one category are a match, but the preference shocks do not affect the idiosyncratic tastes, so
that an owner of two houses is always satisfied with one of them even if she is subject to preference shocks.
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sell their old house, so that the measure of sellers is µS = µD + µL. Since low valuation
households search as buyers and sellers simultaneously, I refer to this equilibrium as the
simultaneous equilibrium.
If low valuation owners only enter the market as buyers, then all of them move to high
valuation ownership via double ownership. In this case only the left route of figure 1 is
used. This means that in steady state, renters disappear. For that reason, the steady state
measure of buyers is equal to the measure of low valuation owners, and the steady state
measure of sellers is the measure of double owners. This ‘first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium is
similar to the sequential search model of Wheaton (1990).5
On the other hand, if low valuation owners only enter the market as sellers, then all of
them move to the high valuation state via rental apartments. As a result, double ownership
disappears, and only the right route of 1 is used. Steady state sellers are low valuation
households, while steady state buyers are renters. This ‘first-sell-then-buy’ equilibrium is
similar to the sequential search model of Piazzesi and Schneider (2009). However, it follows
from Lemma 1 that the two sequential search strategy equilibria can never coexist in steady
state for the same housing supply.
Lemma 1. Housing supply h ∈ (0, 2) determines which of the sequential search strategy
steady states can exist. For 0 < h < 1 the ‘first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium cannot exist,
while for 1 < h < 2 the ‘first-sell-then-buy’ equilibrium cannot exist. For h = 1 neither of
the sequential steady states can exist.
Proof. It follows from the distribution of houses and the sum of the four fractions of house-
holds being one that
h− 1 = µD − µR. (1)
Consequently, for 0 < h < 1 the left-hand side is negative, so that renters cannot disappear,
5For a rental market to continue to exist in this equilibrium, one can assume two types of renters. Anal-
ogous to the distinction between unemployed and non-participants in the labor market, the participating
renters described above are those that search to buy a house, while a second category of renters has no
ambition to enter the housing market and never searches. This last type of renter can be ignored in an
analysis of the owner-occupied housing market.
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while double owners can. For 1 < h < 2 the left-hand side is positive, so that double owners
cannot disappear, while renters can. Since the market collapses if they disappear both, for
h = 1 no sequential steady states exist.
Upon switching between states, the buyer pays the transaction price to the seller. For
simplicity, I follow Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) in assuming that sellers have all bargaining
power, making take-it-or-leave-it offers under perfect information about the buyer’s type. In
case of multiple buyer types, take-it-or-leave-it offers from sellers therefore generally create
endogenous price dispersion. This price dispersion thus results from the different outside
options of different types of buyers, not from the idiosyncratic housing characteristics. For
that reason, the price Pi is indexed by the buyer type i ∈ {L,R} involved in the transaction.
To avoid the Diamond paradox, if buyers have no bargaining power they cannot have search
costs.6 Without search costs, low valuation owners always enter the market as buyers, so
that the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it offers from sellers is not suitable to study the
‘first-sell-then-buy’ equilibrium. However, given Lemma 1 it is harmless to study only one
sequential equilibrium at a time.
To allow for a ‘first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium given Lemma 1, discussing this equilib-
rium I combine the assumption of full bargaining power for sellers with a housing supply
h ∈ (1, 2). Although this implies that the long side of the market has all bargaining power,
note that the higher transaction probabilities of the short side are incorporated in its outside
option. I show that a ‘first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium can exist for the same fundamentals
as a simultaneous search strategy equilibrium. The same mechanism applies for the coex-
istence of the ‘first-sell-then-buy’ and the simultaneous equilibrium (with search costs for
buyers instead of sellers, take-it-or-leave-it offers from buyers, and h ∈ (0, 1)), but in this
paper I omit the presentation of the ‘first-sell-then-buy’ equilibrium. From now on I shall
therefore refer to the ‘first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium as the sequential equilibrium. First I
present the value functions of the different household types.
6Otherwise, buyers would incur costs that are sunk at the moment of trade, without being able to claim
some share of the surplus to cover their costs. Buyers would retreat from search, and the market would
collapse.
9
2.2 Values for four types of households
Households are risk neutral, discount the future at rate r, and care about consumption and
housing services (also denoted in consumption units). All types of households enjoy basic
housing services u. High valuation owners receive additional flow benefits v on top of u.
However, at rate η > 0 they turn into low valuation owners. In principle a high valuation
owner could also sell her house or buy a second house, but I will show that this doesn’t
happen in equilibrium. The flow value of being a high valuation owner is then
rVH = v + u− η(VH − VL). (2)
A low valuation owner wants to find a new house and to find a buyer for her old house.
Because the housing market is characterized by search frictions, moving takes time. Search
is random, and comes at a flow cost c for sellers only. Define market tightness as θ ≡
µB/µS. The number of matches M follows from a (homogenous of degree one) Cobb-
Douglas matching function, taking the measure of buyers and sellers as inputs: M =
m(µB, µS) = m0µ
α
Bµ
1−α
S . The number of matches per seller, or the rate of finding a potential
buyer for one’s house, is thus given by M/µS = m(θ, 1) = m0(µB/µS)
α. Below I derive
conditions such that all matches between potential buyers and sellers result in transactions,
so that in equilibrium the transaction rates p and q are equal to the matching rates for
sellers and buyers respectively. Since the number of sales must always equal the number of
purchases, we have that q = p/θ. In contrast to Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) and Maury
and Tripier (2010), I do not assume that buying and selling takes the same amount of time,
so that in general p 6= q. I only analyze equilibria with positive transaction rates, since
multiplicity of equilibria from market collapse is already well-known.7
Without search costs to buyers, a low valuation owner always enters the market as buyer.
The question is whether she also enters as seller, first transacting on the side of the market
on which the opportunity arises the soonest. The latter search strategy is pursued if and
7The classic reference is Diamond (1982).
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only if the costs c do not exceed the benefits, which depend on the expected price for a
house. Since the buyer type is not known in advance, the expected price is denoted by Pi.
The flow value of a low valuation owner is then
rVL = u+ q(VD − VL − PL) + max[0, p(VR − VL + Pi)− c]. (3)
This equation clearly shows that there are two ways out of the low valuation state, via
double ownership or via renting. Rental housing matched to the preferences of households
is immediately available, so that renters enjoy housing services v+u. However, because the
rental market is competitive and suppliers of rental housing can freely enter and exit the
market, housing services enjoyed by the household are paid in rent R = v + u. A renting
household can search for a new home though, so that her flow value is
rVR = q(VH − VR − PR). (4)
As discussed, owning a second house comes at an additional flow cost F capturing the
double housing expenses that a household owning two houses incurs. On top of that, a
double owner enjoys the basic housing services u for only one house, since she can live in
only one at a time (and cannot rent out the other). On the other hand, a double owner
always enjoys v. Because a double owner cannot buy a third house, her only option is to
sell the house she doesn’t like anymore. The flow value of a double owner is therefore
rVD = v + u− F + max[0, p(VH − VD + Pi)− c]. (5)
The order of buying and selling is important because the household wants to avoid being
stuck in temporary housing or paying double housing expenses. Because any flow benefits
from housing services cancel out against a competitive rental rate, temporary housing is
clearly undesirable. To model paying double housing expenses as a sufficiently serious
problem, I make Assumption 1 throughout the paper.
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Assumption 1. The double housing expenses flow cost F is at least as high as the flow
benefit v of being satisfied with a house.
Both low valuation and double owners can enter the housing market as seller. With
v ≤ F , the flow benefits (not necessarily the benefits to search) of low valuation owners
exceed those of double owners. Because double owners were low valuation owners before
buying a second home, on average double owners have spent more time on the market selling
their house than low valuation owners. In the language of Albrecht, Anderson, Smith, and
Vroman (2007), it is therefore natural to model double owners as the more desperate sellers,
and low valuation owners as the more relaxed sellers. Assumption 1 achieves this, as is
shown in the next section.
3 The simultaneous equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium prices
Because both low valuation owners and renters are buyers in a simultaneous equilibrium,
take-it-or-leave-it offers result in both PL and PR. The resulting price difference follows
from buyers’ two different values of changing states. A low valuation owner pays
PL = VD − VL, (6)
while a renter pays
PR = VH − VR. (7)
The price a seller receives therefore depends on the buyer type. Assume that the buyer
type that pays the lower of the two prices cannot be excluded from the search process of
the seller, or that the seller cannot save on search costs by doing so. The question is then
whether a seller accepts an immediate sale to a buyer of the type that pays the lower price,
or continues to search for a buyer of the type that pays the higher price. When households
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accept to sell to buyers that pay the lower price, there is price dispersion in equilibrium.
In this case, households that search for a buyer expect to sell at PL with a probability
corresponding to the share of low valuation owners in the population of buyers, and at PR
with a probability corresponding to the fraction of renters. The expected price is thus
Pi =
µL
µB
PL +
µR
µB
PR (8)
Subtracting (3) from (5) and rearranging gives PL as a function of PR
PL =
v − F + pPR
r + p
. (9)
With Assumption 1, prices can then be ranked as in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Renters pay a higher price than low valuation owners, and this price is positive.
Proof. Take-it-or-leave-it offers from sellers make renters indifferent to buy, so that VR = 0
and PR = VH . Now note that VL > 0, and that this implies that PR = VH > 0, as can be
seen by rewriting (2) to (r + η)VH = v + u+ ηVL.
Assumption 1 and PR > 0 can subsequently be shown to imply that PR > PL. From (9)
it follows that the difference between both prices is given by
PL − PR = v − F − rPR
r + p
. (10)
PR thus exceeds PL if and only if PR >
v−F
r
, so that PR > PL if PR > 0 and v ≤ F .8
A buyer always starts as a low valuation household, and becomes a renter in case she sells
her old house before buying a new one. Given that the probability that a buyer has become
a renter increases over time, the expected price that a buyer will pay, conditional on the
time she is looking for a house, rises with time spent searching. The result that renters pay
higher prices than low valuation owners illustrates that renters are more desperate buyers
8Note that prices are only equal for PL = PR = (v − F )/r.
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than low valuation owners. Renters gain more by transacting and switching states than low
valuation owners, so that sellers that can make take-it-or-leave-it offers are able to extract
a higher surplus from renters than from low valuation owners. Low valuation owners, on
the other hand, will become a double owner by buying a house. Their alternative road
towards high valuation ownership is via rental housing. Since double owners have lower
flow benefits than low valuation owners (by Assumption 1), low valuation owners will only
be willing to make the transition towards high valuation ownership via double ownership
if they pay a lower price than renters.
Finally, as derived in Appendix A, the price that renters pay is
PR =
v+u
r
+ η
r+p
u−c
r
+ ηp
(r+p)2
µL
µB
v−F
r
1 + η
r+p
+ ηp
(r+p)2
µL
µB
, (11)
which can be substituted in (9) to yield PL. Prices reflect the weighted averages of house-
holds’ (perpetual) benefits and costs, taking discounting, expected durations, and state
transition probabilities into account. These expected durations and hazard rates are the
subject of the next subsection.
3.2 Steady state stocks and flows in the housing market
If all equilibrium existence conditions are satisfied so that p and q do reflect transaction
rates, then steady state stocks and flows follow mechanically from the model. In steady
state, the fractions of high valuation, low valuation and double owners, and renters are
constant: µ˙H = 0, µ˙L = 0, µ˙D = 0, and µ˙R = 0. The following conditions then hold:
µ˙H = 0 : qµR + pµD = ηµH , (12)
µ˙R = 0 : pµL = qµR, (13)
µ˙L = 0 : ηµH = pµL + qµL, (14)
µ˙D = 0 : qµL = pµD. (15)
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Important for prices, the composition of buyers in steady state can be expressed in terms
of p and q from these steady state conditions. Substituting (15) into (12) gives that the
number of transactions is equal to
q(µR + µL) = qµB = ηµH = µL(p+ q), (16)
where the last equality follows from (14). Consequently, the fraction of low valuation owners
in the total measure of buyers is given by µL/µB = q/(p+ q). From the composition of µB
it then follows that µR/µB = p/(p+ q). Similarly, substituting (15) into (14) and following
the same steps, yields µL/µS = p/(p + q), and µD/µS = q/(p + q). Lemma 3 summarizes
the impact of the housing supply on the steady state stocks and flows for the simultaneous
equilibrium.
Lemma 3. h R 1⇔ p Q q ⇔ µR Q µL Q µD.
Proof. From (13) and (15) it follows that θ = p/q = µR/µL = µL/µD. Combining this with
(1) yields
1− h
µL
=
µR
µL
− µD
µL
=
p
q
− q
p
=
p2 − q2
pq
, (17)
which implies the (in)equalities to be proven.
We see that the rate to sell is smaller than the rate to buy if and only if there are more
houses than households, and that this implies that there are more double owners than low
valuation owners, which are more numerous than renters. Note that this result on the
stocks and flows in the housing market is independent of equilibrium prices, given that all
matches are consummated. Maury and Tripier (2010) presents the first equilibrium search
model showing the importance of allowing households to choose the order of buying and
selling. For simplicity they assume p = q, but also in their model this would imply h = 1.
Unfortunately, as shown in Lemma 1, explicitly modeling a housing supply equal to one is
inconsistent with renters to disappear in steady state, which happens if all low valuation
owners first buy.
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With the steady state conditions, all fractions can be written in terms of µL, and using
that fractions sum to one, yields
µL =
1
1 + p
q
+ p+q
η
+ q
p
. (18)
The comparative statics are natural. The measure of low valuation owners is increasing
in η and decreasing in p and q. From (17), the measure of renters is increasing in p and
decreasing in q, whereas the reverse holds for the measure of double owners. The matching
function, (17), and (18) give three equations in the three endogenous variables p > 0, q > 0,
and µL, for a given housing supply h ∈ (0, 2) and preference shock η > 0. Lemma 4 states
that unique solutions for p, q, and µL result. All other stocks of households then follow
uniquely as well. The proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 4. The steady state relationships between the stocks and flows in the simultaneous
equilibrium (as defined by (17), (18) and matching function M = m0µ
α
Bµ
1−α
S ) have unique
positive and real solutions for transaction rates p and q and the measure of low valuation
owners µL, for a given housing supply h ∈ (0, 2) and preference shock η > 0. Moreover, if
and only if h = 1, the single transaction rate (p = q) is equal to m0.
3.3 Participation and equilibrium existence conditions
The existence of the proposed equilibrium requires costly search effort from sellers, and
requires high valuation owners not to enter the market. In addition, it requires sellers to
sell to low valuation owners, even if the latter pay a lower price than renters. Besides,
positive prices are a prerequisite for the plausibility of the proposed equilibrium. Lemma
2 shows that PR is always positive. Unfortunately, with Assumption 1, the same does not
necessarily hold for PL. However, as proven in Appendix C, Proposition 1 states that if
PL > 0, then double owners enter the market as sellers, while high valuation owners never
enter the market as sellers. Remember that a double owner is subject to preference shocks
again once the house is sold, so that spending costly search effort is not trivial. Moreover,
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double owners always sell to both types of buyers. Besides, if a high valuation owner would
buy a second house, she would be made indifferent. I simply assume this transaction never
happens in equilibrium.9
Proposition 1. In the simultaneous equilibrium with take-it-or-leave-it offers from sellers,
1. double owners sell to both renters and low valuation owners;
2. high valuation owners do not enter the market as sellers; and
3. if the price that low valuation owners pay is positive, then double owners search.
Although double owners enter the market as sellers (if PL > 0) and sell to both types of
buyers, low valuation owners are more picky, as argued in Proposition 2. The proof is in
Appendix C.
Proposition 2. Double owners are more desperate sellers than low valuation owners in
the sense that
1. if low valuation owners search, double owners do so as well, but not necessarily the
other way around;
2. if low valuation owners sell to both types of buyers, double owners do so as well, but
not necessarily the other way around.
Since double owners have lower flow benefits than low valuation owners, this result is
similar to Albrecht, Anderson, Smith, and Vroman’s results on the matching pattern of
buyers and sellers. If relaxed owners sell to their non-preferred type of buyer, then des-
perate owners do so as well. As a result, strict negative assortative matching is ruled
out. Albrecht, Anderson, Smith, and Vroman (2007) elaborate on the possible equilibrium
matching patterns of their model, while I focus on the conditions under which households
sell to both types of buyers. By focusing on the participation constraints to search, equi-
librium multiplicity arises from a different source than in Albrecht, Anderson, Smith, and
9Only a double owner would be willing to sell to a high valuation owner, but this transaction has no
surplus. A transaction between a high and a low valuation owner has a negative surplus.
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Vroman. If the participation constraint of low valuation owners is not satisfied, while it is
for double owners, then an equilibrium in which low valuation owners always first buy and
then sell might be possible. The next section shows such a sequential equilibrium.
4 The ‘first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium
In a sequential equilibrium low valuation owners do not enter the market as sellers, while
for the market not to break down, double owners must continue to do so. In principle this
difference in behavior is possible, because double owners are more desperate to sell than
low valuation owners by Proposition 2.10 Besides, we know that if low valuation owners
stop entering the market as seller, renters disappear in steady state. Allowing renters to
disappear requires a housing supply h ∈ (1, 2) by Lemma 1, which is therefore assumed in
this section. The transaction rates, household measures, asset values of household types,
and thus prices, generally take different values in a sequential equilibrium than in a simul-
taneous equilibrium. I use primes to denote these variables in the sequential equilibrium.
The single price in the market results from transactions between low valuation and
double owners, the only buyers and sellers respectively. When sellers make take-it-or-leave-
it offers and low valuation owners only search as buyers, the asset value of being a low
valuation owner is simply u/r. The price makes low valuation owners indifferent to buy,
and is thus P ′L = V
′
D − u/r. Solving (2), (3), and (5) under these assumptions, yields
P ′L =
v − F − c
r
+
p′
r
v
r + η
. (19)
The difference between the value for a high valuation owner relative to a low valuation
owner, V ′H − V ′L, is v/(r + η). The price P ′L therefore reflects the perpetual flows of double
ownership minus those of low valuation ownership (v − F − c), plus the option value of
selling the old house and enjoying the benefits of a high relative to a low valuation owner.
10Note from a contraposition of the proof of this proposition that if PL > PR, low valuation owners
always search if double owners search.
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The plausibility of the equilibrium requires a nonnegative value for P ′L, but this is only the
case if p′ ≥ p, with
p ≡ F + c− v
r
/
v
r(r + η)
, (20)
which is always positive under Assumption 1. If P ′L is indeed nonnegative, then double
owners search, as stated in Lemma 5 and proven in Appendix C. Moreover, high valuation
owners never enter the market as sellers if low valuation owners do not do so, which defines
the sequential equilibrium.
Lemma 5. In a sequential equilibrium with take-it-or-leave-it offers from sellers,
1. high valuation owners do not search if low valuation owners do not search; and
2. if the price is nonnegative, then double owners search.
Now imagine a single low valuation owner that considers to deviate from the sequential
search strategy by simultaneously searching as a seller. A single household will only be able
to sell her house to other low valuation owners, making one of them a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. For the sequential equilibrium to exist, it must not be worthwhile to do so. The
threshold for a low valuation owner to enter the market as seller is when benefits equal
costs, thus if
p′(V ′R − V ′L + P ′L) = c
Assume for now that double owners sell to renters. The low valuation owner then knows
that once she becomes a renter, she will be made a take-it-or-leave-it offer P ′R = V
′
H by a
double owner and her value will be zero. Since the single deviating household has measure
zero, the presence of a single renter has no impact on the price that double owners expect
to receive for their old house, so that their participation constraint is unaffected. If the
low valuation owner finds a new house before being able to sell her old house, she will
also be made a take-it-or-leave-it offer. For that reason, if the participation constraint
to enter the market as seller is satisfied with equality, the asset value of a low valuation
owner is u/r, just as in the sequential equilibrium. As a result, in this case the price a
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deviating household will be able to ask for her house is equal to the going price in the
market: P ′L. In addition, V
′
H will also be the same as in the sequential equilibrium, so that
P ′R = v/(r+η)+u/r. Because Lemma 2 can be checked to apply in a sequential equilibrium
in which low valuation owners are indifferent to enter the market as sellers, P ′R > P
′
L and
double owners indeed sell to renters.11 Under these conditions, a low valuation owner is
indifferent to enter the market as seller for
p′(P ′L − V ′L) = p′
v − F − c− u
r
+
p′2
r
v
r + η
= c (21)
Lemma 6 states that there exists a unique positive p′ for which this participation constraint
is satisfied with equality.
Lemma 6. If the sequential equilibrium exists, there exists a unique positive p such that a
single low valuation owner is indifferent to enter the market as seller.
Proof. The solutions of (21) are given by
p′ =
F+c+u−v
r
±
√(
v−c−F−u
r
)2
+ 4c
r
v
r+η
2
r
v
r+η
Since the determinant is positive, two real solutions exist. Since the absolute value of the
term in parentheses is the same as the first term, the square root always dominates the first
term. As a result, one of the two solutions is positive, p, while the other is negative.
Proposition 3 gives the range of selling probabilities for which the sequential equilibrium
always exists, in which p is the unique threshold for a low valuation owner not to enter the
market as seller in the sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 3. For any p′ ∈ [p, p], which is nonempty, the sequential equilibrium exists
with a nonnegative price P ′L. For p
′ > p no sequential equilibrium can exist.
11Subtract (3) from (5) without substituting p(VR−VL+Pi) = c and rearrange to note that VD−VL < VH
under Assumption 1.
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Proof. Lemma 6 states that there is a unique p for which a low valuation owner is indifferent
to enter the market as seller in the sequential equilibrium. The shape of the parabola (21),
in particular v
r(r+η)
> 0, then implies that for 0 < p′ < p, the net benefit of search is
negative. Because of the max-function, the participation constraint is the same in case low
valuation owners are not indifferent but have negative net benefits from search, so that low
valuation owners do not search for 0 < p′ < p. Using Lemma 5, all equilibrium existence
conditions are then satisfied if parameters are such that P ′L ≥ 0 for some p′ ∈ (0, p]. We
know that this is the case for p′ > p. Since both the first term and the square root of p
are larger than the numerator of p, p < p. As a result, for any p′ ∈ [p, p] the sequential
equilibrium exists. For p′ > p low valuation owners have incentives to search, so that no
sequential equilibrium can exist.
Finally, p′ follows uniquely from the stocks and flows in a sequential equilibrium, as
stated in Lemma 7. The proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 7. The steady state relationships between the stocks and flows in the sequential
equilibrium have unique positive solutions for transaction rates p′ and q′ and the measures
µ′L, µ
′
D, and µ
′
H for a given housing supply h ∈ (1, 2) and preference shock η > 0.
In the next section I investigate whether a simultaneous equilibrium can exist for the
same fundamentals as a sequential equilibrium.
5 Multiple equilibria in the housing market
5.1 Desperate buyers complementarities
We have seen that there is a unique threshold p for a low valuation owner not to enter
the market as seller in the sequential equilibrium. In this subsection I study the same
threshold for the simultaneous equilibrium. Consider a simultaneous equilibrium where
the net benefit of low valuation owners to search to sell is exactly zero, so that VL = u/r.
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In this case, PL is simply VD − u/r, and is given by
PL =
v − c− F
r
+
p
r
v
r + η
+
p
r
µR
µB
(PR − PL). (22)
Comparing (19) and (22), the difference between PL and P
′
L is given by the additional term
p
r
µR
µB
(PR − PL). Consequently, assuming for now that the rate to sell is the same across
equilibria (p = p′), the ranking of PR and PL in the simultaneous equilibrium determines
the ranking of PL and P
′
L across equilibria. Because PR > PL by Lemma 2 (which still
applies if VL = u/r), P
′
L in the sequential equilibrium is smaller than PL in the simultaneous
equilibrium at V ′L = VL = u/r. As a result, with PR > PL > P
′
L the benefits of selling
at V ′L = VL = u/r are higher in the simultaneous equilibrium than in the sequential
equilibrium. The presence of more desperate buyers that pay higher prices (renters) gives
other households incentives to sell and thus to become such desperate buyers as well. There
is a complementarity in the order of buying and selling. As claimed in Proposition 4, low
valuation owners in the simultaneous equilibrium may therefore search for a p∗ for which
low valuation owners in the sequential equilibrium do not search.
Proposition 4. There exists a p∗ ∈ (0, p) for which low valuation owners in the simulta-
neous equilibrium are indifferent to enter the market as sellers or not, while low valuation
owners in the sequential equilibrium have negative net benefits from entering the market as
sellers, if these equilibria exist. Moreover, u ≥ F is sufficient for p∗ > p, and thus for the
sequential equilibrium to exist.
Proof. Because VL = u/r if low valuation owners are indifferent, in the simultaneous equi-
librium PR = VH = v/(r + η) + u/r. Rewriting (9) as PR − PL = (rPL − v + F )/r,
substituting this into (22) and rearranging, yields
µL
µB
PL =
µL
µB
v − F
r
− c
r
+
p
r
v
r + η
.
Low valuation owners in the simultaneous equilibrium are thus indifferent to search if
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p(
µR
µB
PR +
µL
µB
PL − VL
)
= p
(
µL
µB
v − F − u
r
− c
r
+
µR
µB
v
r + η
)
+
p2
r
v
r + η
= c.
For the same reasons as in Lemma 6, this quadratic equation has one positive solution as
well: p∗. Moreover, p∗ < p because the term in parentheses is larger than (v−F − c−u)/r
in (21), while the remainder of the equation is the same. Besides, the sequential equilibrium
exists with a positive price at p∗ if p∗ > p, thus if
µL
µB
F + u− v
r
+
c
r
− µR
µB
v
r + η
>
F + c− v
r
⇔ µL
µB
(r + η)u >
µR
µB
((r + η)F − ηv)
By Lemma 3, if h ∈ (1, 2) then µR < µL, so that u ≥ F is sufficient for p∗ > p.
Consequently, there exists a selling rate p∗ for which the participation constraint of low
valuation owners in the simultaneous equilibrium is satisfied, while it is not in the sequential
equilibrium. Moreover, the existence of the sequential equilibrium with a positive price at
p∗ is guaranteed if u ≥ F (which seems plausible given that being homeless is clearly very
undesirable). It is in this sense that Maury and Tripier (2010) speak about the existence
of ‘multiple equilibria’. However, p and p′ are endogenous. Proposition 5 shows that the
rate to sell is smaller in the simultaneous steady state than in the sequential steady state.
Lemma 8 is instrumental to this result.
Lemma 8. Comparing the sequential and the simultaneous steady state for the same η,
the steady state with the larger number of transactions is the steady state with the higher
measure of high valuation owners.
Proof. In both steady states the measure of high valuation owners is the number of trans-
actions divided by η, as can be seen in (16) for the simultaneous equilibrium and in (27)
for the sequential equilibrium. Consequently, if and only if the number of transactions is
larger, there are more high valuation owners in steady state.
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One might think that the simultaneous equilibrium, with two types of sellers and two
types of buyers, features more sellers and more buyers than the sequential equilibrium.
As a result, since the matching function is increasing in its arguments, the simultaneous
equilibrium would be characterized by more transactions, and by Lemma 8, by a larger
measure of high valuation owners. However, the next subsection shows by example that
there are not necessarily more buyers in the simultaneous equilibrium than in the sequential
equilibrium. On the other hand, it does follow from Proposition 5 that there are always
more sellers in the simultaneous equilibrium. In addition, the time to sell is always longer
in this equilibrium than in the sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 5. For the same fundamentals η and h ∈ (1, 2), there are fewer double owners
and more low valuation owners, and the rate to sell is larger and the rate to buy is smaller in
the sequential steady state than in the simultaneous steady state, if these equilibria coexist.
Proof. Since renters disappear in the sequential steady state, from (1) it follows that for
the same h ∈ (1, 2) there must be fewer double owners in the sequential steady state than
in the simultaneous steady state. Now suppose that there would also be more low valuation
owners in the simultaneous steady state (next to more double owners and renters). In this
case there would be more sellers and more buyers in the simultaneous steady state. Because
the matching function is increasing in its arguments, the number of transactions would be
higher, and by Lemma 8 there would also be more high valuation owners for the same η.
However, not all fractions can be larger. Consequently, there must be fewer low valuation
owners in the simultaneous steady state than in the sequential steady state.
Besides, in both steady states market tightness is given by µL
µD
= p
q
. Note that p and q
(and p′ and q′) move in opposite directions due to the constant returns to scale matching
function, and remember from Lemmas 4 and 7 respectively that p and q, and p′ and q′ are
unique. As a result, p′ > p and q′ < q, if both equilibria exist for the same fundamentals.
The fact that p′ in the sequential equilibrium is endogenously larger than p in the
simultaneous equilibrium has two important consequences. First, since P ′L and PL are
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increasing in p′ and p respectively, this opens up the possibility that P ′L exceeds PL. In
this case, for the net benefit of search to be nonnegative in the simultaneous equilibrium
and negative in the sequential equilibrium, PR must exceed PL even more than if the rate
to sell would not change across equilibria.
Secondly, even if prices are such that a selling rate p∗ or a range of selling rates exists
for which the participation constraint in the simultaneous equilibrium is satisfied while it is
not in the sequential equilibrium, then still this range of selling rates may not be consistent
with a range of fundamentals for h and η. The issue is illustrated in figure 2. Equilibrium
existence conditions of the sequential equilibrium may be satisfied for p′ ∈ (p, p), and
those of the simultaneous equilibrium for any p larger than p∗ ∈ (p, p) (the shaded areas).
However, because p < p′ there may be no fundamentals that make both p and p′ lie within
(p∗, p). In contrast, the figure shows a situation in which multiple equilibria do exist.
Sequential 
equilibrium 
Simultaneous 
equilibrium 
p p 
p* 
p 
p' 
Mechanics from 
stocks and flows  
For the same 
fundamentals 
Figure 2: Existence conditions for multiple equilibria
It thus follows from Proposition 5 that the simultaneous equilibrium is ‘stable’ in the
sense that if low valuation owners stop entering the market as seller, the rate at which
sellers can sell their house increases, (partly) restoring incentives to search. On the other
hand, the rate at which buyers can buy a new house decreases. As a result, if other low
valuation owners stop entering the market as seller, households that continue to enter the
market as sellers and become renters, are likely to be stuck in temporary housing for a
longer duration. However, since renters are made a take-it-or-leave-it offer, sellers make
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renters indifferent to their time on the market. Under these assumptions, at least with a
constant returns to scale matching function, equilibrium multiplicity can therefore never
arise from search externalities per se. The source of equilibrium multiplicity must therefore
lie in price dispersion and the composition of buyer types.
In the next subsection I show numerically that there exists a housing supply and a
preference shock resulting in a p and a p′, such that at p low valuation owners enter the
market as sellers, while p′ ∈ (p, p) so that the sequential equilibrium exists with a positive
price. It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that the single remaining condition for the
simultaneous equilibrium to exist is that low valuation owners sell to both types of buyers.
I check that this equilibrium existence condition is also satisfied at the same p. As a result,
multiple equilibria exist for the same housing supply and preference shocks. The next
subsection also compares these equilibria in terms of welfare.
5.2 Two numerical examples and welfare
In this subsection I give two numerical examples, each resulting in multiple equilibria. The
examples differ in the ranking of the number of transactions across equilibria. It follows
from Lemma 8 that these examples then also differ in their ranking of the measure of high
valuation owners across equilibria. Comparing the examples in terms of welfare, however,
the sequential equilibrium dominates the simultaneous equilibrium in both cases. This
numerical result is representative for most parameter values experimented with for which
multiple equilibria exist.
I define welfare Ω as the sum of the asset values of each household type, weighted for
their share in the population. In addition, I include the housing services enjoyed by renters
as a perpetuity, also weighted by their fraction, effectively assuming that all households
are also landlords and share in the rental payments. An example in which the sequential
equilibrium dominates the simultaneous equilibrium, even if the measure of high valuation
owners is larger in the simultaneous equilibrium, then exists due to a larger value for double
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owners in the sequential equilibrium, as claimed in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. If welfare is larger in the sequential equilibrium than in the simultaneous
equilibrium, if PL, P
′
L > 0, and if there are more high valuation owners in the simultaneous
equilibrium than in the sequential equilibrium, then the value of double ownership is larger
in the sequential equilibrium than in the simultaneous equilibrium.
Proof. Remember that VL ≥ V ′L due to the net benefits of search, so that also VH ≥ V ′H .
We also have that V ′H > V
′
L (as noted in the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix C) and that
VH > VL (as follows from Appendix A, given that PR > PL). In addition, for positive prices
by definition VD > VL and V
′
D > V
′
L. Moreover, the perpetuity of rental payments (v+u)/r
exceeds V ′H = v/(r+ η) +u/r, and VH (which is PR, in which (v+u)/r is the largest of the
terms of the weighted average making up PR). Finally, by Proposition 5 there are more
renters and double owners, and fewer low valuation owners in the simultaneous than in the
sequential equilibrium. The proposition can then be proven by showing that if VD > V
′
D
and µH > µ
′
H , then Ω > Ω
′. If VD > V ′D, then
µ′DVD + µ
′
LVL + µ
′
HVH > µ
′
DV
′
D + µ
′
LV
′
L + µ
′
HV
′
H = Ω
′.
Now subtracting the left-hand side above from the definition of Ω, yields
(µD − µ′D)VD + (µL − µ′L)VL + (µH − µ′H)VH + µR
(
v + u
r
)
.
If µH > µ
′
H (as in the numerical example), then this difference in welfare is positive, because
only µL − µ′L is negative, while VL < VH < (v + u)/r, VL < VD, and µD − µ′D + µL − µ′L +
µH − µ′H + µR = 0. Consequently, Ω > Ω′.
So even if there are slightly more high valuation owners and fewer low valuation owners
in the simultaneous equilibrium, and even though their asset values are higher in the
simultaneous equilibrium, the sequential equilibrium is often superior in terms of welfare.
If all of this is the case, as in the next numerical example, it is because the asset value
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for double owners is larger in the sequential equilibrium. As a corollary, note from (5)
that the ranking of VD and V
′
D must result from the fact that p
′ > p, given that VH > V ′H
and that average prices are larger in the simultaneous equilibrium. For that reason, the
endogenously higher selling rate of the sequential equilibrium can improve welfare, because
the risk of paying double housing expenses for a long time is smaller in a housing market
in which all households take this risk. Maury and Tripier (2010) take the asset value of a
high valuation owner to represent total welfare. Unfortunately, given the result above, their
procedure can give wrong conclusions if one allows transaction rates to be endogenous.
In my numerical examples, I calibrate all flows at a quarterly frequency, and for that
reason set discount rate r at 0.012. Assume that households want to move on average
once in ten years between owner-occupied houses, and therefore set η = 0.025. I normalize
the flow utility u from not being homeless at 5 (thousand). Following Assumption 1, I
assume that v > F and set additional housing services from being satisfied at 2 and double
housing expenses at 2.5. Seller’s search costs c are 0.1. In the first example, the Cobb-
Douglas matching function has parameters m0 = 1 and α = 0.5, so that buyers and sellers
are given an equal elasticity in the matching process.
I use (21) to find the selling rate p for which low valuation owners in the sequential
equilibrium are indifferent to search, and back out the housing supply h that results in this
p given the shock process η. This procedure results in h ≈ 1.19 for the parameters chosen
above. Subsequently I experiment with a slightly larger housing supply, and check whether
both the simultaneous and the sequential equilibrium exist for the same h and η.
The endogenous variables (now without primes) of the first numerical example are pre-
sented in table 2. For the chosen parameters, PR > P
′
L > PL > 0, and the equilibrium
existence conditions for both equilibria are satisfied. In particular, low valuation owners
enter the market as sellers and sell to both types of buyers in the simultaneous equilibrium,
while they do not search in the sequential equilibrium. It follows that average prices are
higher in the simultaneous equilibrium. However, since Lemma 3 shows that µR < µL < µD
in the simultaneous equilibrium for h > 1 (as confirmed in the numerical example), median
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and modal prices are higher in the sequential equilibrium. The numerical example also con-
firms the results of Proposition 5 that µD and q are larger in the simultaneous equilibrium,
and µL and p are larger in the sequential equilibrium. We see that in this first numerical
example there are more transactions and more high valuation owners in the simultaneous
equilibrium than in the sequential equilibrium, but these differences are tiny. Moreover,
note that the measure of buyers in the simultaneous equilibrium (µL + µR) is smaller than
in the sequential equilibrium (µL). Finally, the sequential equilibrium is superior to the
simultaneous equilibrium in terms of welfare.
Variable Simultaneous equilibrium Sequential equilibrium
PL 417.1 417.3
PR 470.7
p 0.103 0.104
q 9.741 9.639
µL 0.00204 0.00209
µD 0.19380 0.19377
µR 0.00002 0
µH 0.8041413 0.8041409
# of transactions 0.02010353 0.02010352
Welfare 540.99 541.00
Table 2: Endogenous variables of a simultaneous and a sequential equilibrium for the same fun-
damentals, in particular α = 0.5 and h = 1.19377.
Because the measure of buyers in the simultaneous equilibrium can be larger than in
the sequential equilibrium, as in the numerical example of table 2, the simultaneous equi-
librium is not necessarily characterized by more transactions and a larger measure of high
valuation owners. Simply by increasing the elasticity of the matching function, the number
of transactions and the measure of high valuation owners can be larger in the sequential
equilibrium than in the simultaneous equilibrium. Table 3 presents a second numerical
example with α equal to 0.55, a reconstructed housing supply still approximately 1.19 (us-
ing the procedure explained above), while keeping all other parameters fixed. The first
seven rows show no qualitative differences, but now the number of transactions and the
measure of high valuation owners is larger in the sequential equilibrium than in the simul-
29
taneous equilibrium. Welfare is still larger in the sequential equilibrium, but now also its
larger measure of high valuation owners contributes to its superiority over the simultaneous
equilibrium, and not only its smaller time to sale.
Variable Simultaneous equilibrium Sequential equilibrium
PL 416.9 417.6
PR 470.8
p 0.102 0.104
q 6.465 6.381
µL 0.00306 0.00315
µD 0.19353 0.19348
µR 0.00005 0
µH 0.80337 0.80338
# of transactions 0.0200842 0.0200844
Welfare 540.87 540.89
Table 3: Endogenous variables of a simultaneous and a sequential equilibrium for the same fun-
damentals, in particular α = 0.55 and h = 1.19348.
Because p can be interpreted as the rate of liquidity, as it captures the speed at which
households can transfer their illiquid assets to cash, the multiple equilibria can represent
phases of high and low liquidity. The period before the Great Recession can be represented
by the sequential equilibrium, in which liquidity is high and relatively many low valuation
owners buy a new house before selling their old houses, just as in table 1. The period
during the Great Recession can then be represented by the simultaneous equilibrium. In a
sequential equilibrium the steady state fraction of people paying double housing expenses
is smaller than in a simultaneous equilibrium, due to a smaller time to sale. This matches
with the common observation that the problem of being stuck with two houses is more
severe during than it was before the Great Recession. Finally, as reported in table 1, the
number of transactions is substantially larger before than during the Great Recession. The
numerical examples show that this experience can be consistent with the multiple equilibria
presented in this paper if the elasticity of the matching function is sufficiently large.
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6 Conclusion
Even with a constant returns to scale matching function, an equilibrium search model of the
housing market may be characterized by multiple equilibria. Allowing households to choose
the order of buying and selling is likely to result in more or less desperate households. More
desperate buyers accept to pay higher prices, giving rise to endogenous price dispersion.
The presence of these desperate buyers motivates sellers to search and to become desperate
buyers themselves. However, in the absence of these buyers, sellers would not search and
would not become desperate buyers. Indeed, when households first buy a new house before
selling their old house, in steady state nobody rents temporary housing. However, renters
pay higher prices than households looking for a second house. For that reason, when
households stop to enter the market as sellers, households paying relatively high prices
disappear from the market. As a result, it is individually rational to stop searching as a
seller. However, if households would continue to enter the market as sellers, renters would
survive in the market, and their willingness to pay higher prices would have made entering
the market as sellers rational. The same mechanism applies if all household first sell and
households owning two houses disappear in steady state.
Interestingly, in the equilibrium in which all households first buy a new house and thus
become the owner of two houses, the steady state fraction of owners of two houses is smaller
than in the equilibrium in which some households first sell their house and only then buy
a new house, never owning two houses. The reason is that, although indeed in the ’first-
buy-then-sell’ equilibrium the inflow rate into the state of owning two houses is larger
than in the latter equilibrium, the outflow rate is so much larger in the ’first-buy-then-sell’
equilibrium that the steady state fraction of households owning two houses is lower than in
the other equilibrium. Consequently, the risk of paying double housing expenses for a long
time is smaller in a housing market in which all households take this risk, as compared to a
market where some households avoid this risk by first selling their old house, only buying a
new house afterwards and renting in the meantime. Since the outflow rate out of the state
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of two houses is the inverse of the time to sale, it captures the rate at which an illiquid
asset can be transformed in cash. It can therefore be argued that the ’first-buy-then-sell’
equilibrium is characterized by a higher liquidity. I show numerically that this effect can
make the ’first-buy-then-sell’ equilibrium superior in terms of welfare.
Phases of high and low liquidity may therefore be the result of different self-fulfilling
expectations about the search behavior of market participants. The ’first-buy-then-sell’
equilibrium, with its higher liquidity and smaller fraction of double owners, can represent
the period before the Great Recession, whereas the equilibrium in which households enter
the market as buyers and sellers simultaneously can represent the period of the Great
Recession. If the contribution of buyers towards the matching process is sufficiently large,
these two equilibria can also explain the difference in the number of transactions. This
paper, however, does not consider the dynamics between the steady states. Future research
might clarify the transition paths between different steady states, and study their stability.
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Appendices
A Derivation of the price paid by renters
Take-it-or-leave-it offers from sellers imply that low valuation owners have zero benefits
from entering the market as buyer. The difference between (2) and (3) is then
r(VH − VL) = v − η(VH − VL) + c− p
(
VR − VL + µL
µB
PL +
µR
µB
PR
)
⇔ (r + η + p)(VH − VL) = v + c− p
(
VR − VH + µL
µB
PL +
µR
µB
PR
)
= v + c+ p
(
PR − µL
µB
PL − µR
µB
PR
)
= v + c+ p
µL
µB
(PR − PL)
⇔ VH − VL = v + c
r + η + p
+
p
r + η + p
µL
µB
rPR − v + F
r + p
, (23)
where the last step substitutes (10) for the price difference.
From (7) and (4) it follows that VR = 0 and thus that PR = VH . Substituting (23) in
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(2) gives PR as a function of the parameters
rPR = rVH = v + u− η(v + c)
r + η + p
− ηp
r + p
µL
µB
rPR − v + F
r + η + p(
r +
r
r + p
ηp
r + η + p
µL
µB
)
PR = v + u− η(v + c)
r + η + p
+
ηp
r + p
µL
µB
v − F
r + η + p
PR =
v + u− η(v+c)
r+η+p
+ ηp
r+p
µL
µB
v−F
r+η+p
r + r
r+p
ηp
r+η+p
µL
µB
. (24)
Rearranging gives the price as a weighted average as in 11 in the text.
B Proof of unique p and q
Proof of Lemma 4. From the matching function, p = m0(p/q)
α, so that if p = q, then
p = q = m0. We know from Lemma 3 that this occurs if and only if h = 1. To see that
also for h 6= 1 there exists a unique and positive solution, combine (17) and (18) to obtain
p2 − q2
pq
= (1− h)
(
1 +
p
q
+
p+ q
η
+
q
p
)
. (25)
Now substitute q = m
1
α
0 p
α−1
α into (25) and rearrange to
1− h
η
(
η + p+m
1
α
0 p
α−1
α
)
+ (2− h)
(
m0
p
) 1
α
− h
(
p
m0
) 1
α
= 0. (26)
Distinguish between 0 < h < 1 and 1 < h < 2:
• First consider the case in which h ∈ (1, 2). Multiply (26) by p 1−αα , and define the
left-hand side as a new function:
f(p) =
1− h
η
(
ηp
1−α
α + p
1
α +m
1
α
0
)
+ (2− h)m
1
α
0
p
− hp
2−α
α
m
1
α
0
I will proof that the function f(p) has only one real and positive solution for which
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it is zero. The derivative of this function is
f ′(p) =
1− h
η
(
η
(
1− α
α
)
p
1−2α
α +
1
α
p
1−α
α
)
− (2− h)m
1
α
0
p2
− h
(
2− α
α
)
p2
1−α
α
m
1
α
0
,
which is monotonically decreasing given that 0 < α < 1, 1 < h < 2, η > 0, and
m0 > 0. Consequently, there is at most one real solution for which f(p) = 0. By
taking the limits of f(p) as p goes to zero and to infinity, I show that exactly one real
solution exists, and that it is positive:
lim
p→0
[
1− h
η
(
ηp
1−α
α + p
1
α +m
1
α
0
)
+ (2− h)m
1
α
0
p
− hp
2−α
α
m
1
α
0
]
=∞,
lim
p→∞
[
1− h
η
(
ηp
1−α
α + p
1
α +m
1
α
0
)
+ (2− h)m
1
α
0
p
− hp
2−α
α
m
1
α
0
]
= −∞.
Since the function f(p) is continuous and goes from infinity to minus infinity for p
going from zero to infinity, it has to become zero for a positive p, only once as we
know. A unique and positive q follows from the matching function.
• Now consider the case in which h ∈ (0, 1). Multiply (26) by p− 1α , and define the
left-hand side as a new function:
g(p) =
1− h
η
(
η
p
1
α
+ p
α−1
α +m
1
α
0 p
α−2
α
)
+ (2− h)m0
p
2
α
− h
m
1
α
0
.
Also the continuous function g(p) has only one real and positive solution for which it
is zero. Its derivative is
g′(p) =
1− h
η
(
− 1
α
η
p
1+α
α
+
(
α− 1
α
)
p−
1
α +
(
α− 2
α
)
m
1
α
0
p
2
α
)
− (2− h) 2
α
m0
p
2+α
α
,
35
which is again monotonically decreasing. The limits of g(p) are given by
lim
p→0
[
1− h
η
(
η
p
1
α
+ p
α−1
α +m
1
α
0 p
α−2
α
)
+ (2− h)m0
p
2
α
− h
m
1
α
0
]
=∞,
lim
p→∞
[
1− h
η
(
η
p
1
α
+ p
α−1
α +m
1
α
0 p
α−2
α
)
+ (2− h)m0
p
2
α
− h
m
1
α
0
]
= − h
m
1
α
0
.
As a result, also for h ∈ (0, 1) unique positive and real solutions for p and q exist.
Unique positive and real solutions for p and q can be substituted in (18) to obtain a unique
and positive µL.
Proof of Lemma 7. In a sequential equilibrium there are no renters, and double owners
are the only sellers. From (1) with h ∈ (1, 2), it then follows that h − 1 = µ′D = µ′S.
The matching function can subsequently be used to solve for µ′L, since for a given housing
supply and shock process steady state accounting yields
η(2− h− µ′L) = ηµ′H = m(µ′B, µ′S) = m(µ′L, h− 1). (27)
Because the left-hand side is decreasing in µ′L, while the right-hand side is increasing, a
solution for µ′L is unique. Existence follows from h ∈ (1, 2) and the fact that m(0, h−1) = 0,
combined with continuity and the monotonicity referred to earlier. Given the definition of
tightness and the equality of buying and selling transactions, θ′ ≡ µ′B/µ′S = µ′L/µ′D = p′/q′.
Given tightness, housing supply and preference shocks, I can solve for the unique p′ (and
thus q′) by expressing all steady state fractions in terms of µ′D
µ′D = h− 1 =
1
θ′ + p′/η + 1
. (28)
Finally, the measure of high valuation owners is given by µ′H = p
′µ′D/η.
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C Equilibrium existence conditions
Proof of Proposition 1.
1. Remember that sellers cannot exclude low valuation owners from showing up at their
house, or that they cannot save on search costs by doing so. If the seller does not
immediately sell her house at a discount to a low valuation owner that shows up, it
is only worthwhile to continue looking for a renter. Otherwise, since the environment
is static, the house could better be sold to the low valuation owner immediately.
Denoting the continuation value of a double owner searching for a renter by V RD ,
double owners sell to both types of buyers if and only if
r(VH + PL) ≥ rV RD = v + u+ p
µR
µB
(VH − V RD + PR)− c− F
⇔ PR + PL ≥ V RD =
v + u− c− F + 2pµR
µB
PR
r + pµR
µB
(29)
⇔ (r + pµR
µB
)(PR + PL) ≥ v + u− c− F + 2pµR
µB
PR
⇔ r(PR + PL) ≥ v + u− c− F + pµR
µB
(PR − PL)
⇔ v − F + (r + 2p)PR
r + p
≥ v + u− c− F
r
− p
r + p
µR
µB
v − F − rPR
r
⇔ v − F + (r + 2p)PR ≥ pv + u− c− F
r
+ v + u− c− F − p
r
µR
µB
(v − F − rPR)
⇔
(
r + p+ p
µL
µB
)
PR ≥ pµL
µB
v − F
r
+ (r + p)
u− c
r
⇔ PR ≥
p µL
µB
v−F
r
+ (r + p)u−c
r
r + p+ p µL
µB
⇔ PR ≥
p
r+p
µL
µB
v−F
r
+ u−c
r
1 + p
r+p
µL
µB
. (30)
Comparing inequality (30) with expression (11) for PR, the inequality is always sat-
isfied.
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2. It is not in the interest of a high valuation owner to search to sell her house if
p
(
VR − VH + µL
µB
PL +
µR
µB
PR
)
≤ c
⇔ pµL
µB
(PL − PR) ≤ c.
Since PR > PL by Lemma 2, high valuation owners do not enter the market as sellers.
3. For double owners the benefits of search weakly dominate the costs if
c ≤ p(VH − VD + P ) = rVD − v − u+ c+ F (31)
⇔ VD ≥ v + u− F
r
.
Since PL = VD−VL and since VL is at least u/r due to the max-functions, VD exceeds
u/r if PL > 0. With Assumption 1, the participation constraint of double owners is
therefore satisfied if PL is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2.
1. It follows from the ranking of prices by Lemma 2, and the equality of expected prices
Pi,L and Pi,D that
PL < PR
⇔ VD − VL < VH − VR
⇔ VR − VL < VH − VD
⇔ p(VR − VL + Pi,L)− c < p(VH − VD + Pi,D)− c, (32)
which are the participation constraints of low valuation and double owners respec-
tively. Consequently, the net benefits of search for double owners exceed those for
low valuation owners.
38
2. Denoting the continuation value of a low valuation owner searching for a renter by
V RL , low valuation owners sell to both types of buyers if and only if
r(VR + PL) ≥ rV RL = u+ p
µR
µB
(VR − V RL + PR)− c
⇔ PL ≥ V RL =
pµR
µB
PR + u− c
r + pµR
µB
. (33)
To see that this condition is stronger than the one for double owners, subtract (33)
from (29), to obtain
PR ≥
v − F + pµR
µB
PR
r + pµR
µB
⇔
(
r + p
µR
µB
)
PR ≥ v − F + pµR
µB
PR
⇔ rPR ≥ v − F,
which is always satisfied under Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.
1. Again I assume that a high valuation owner indifferent to buy a second house does not
carry out this transaction in equilibrium. More importantly, it is not in her interest
to search to sell her house, if low valuation owners do not enter the market as sellers
either. This implication can be seen from
v/(r + η) > 0
⇔ V ′H > V ′L
⇔ p′(V ′R − V ′L + P ′L)− c > p′(V ′R − V ′H + P ′L)− c,
so that the net benefits of search of low valuation owners always dominate those of
high valuation owners.
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2. Double owners search if the benefits are not smaller than the costs, thus if
p(V ′H − V ′D + P ′L) ≥ c
⇔ p′(V ′H − V ′L) ≥ c
⇔ p′ v
r + η
≥ c,
which, given Assumption 1, is a necessary condition for P ′L to be nonnegative.
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